

Endogenous Price Leadership*

Eric van Damme

CentER, Tilburg University,

P.O. Box 90153,

5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

Sjaak Hurkens

Department of Economics,

Universitat Pompeu Fabra,

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27,

08005 Barcelona, Spain.

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Abstract

We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with differentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which one will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose to wait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader. *Journal of Economic Literature* Classification Numbers: C72, D43.

1 Introduction

Standard game theoretic models of oligopoly situations impose the order of the moves exogenously, an assumption that was already criticized in Von Stackelberg (1934), well before game theory invaded the field of industrial organization. Von Stackelberg pointed out that players have preferences over which role (leader or follower) to play in the game and he argued that a stable equilibrium would result only if the actual role assignment would be consistent with these preferences. As Von Stackelberg argued, in many situations both duopolists prefer the same role so that a stable situation does not appear to exist.

In the case of quantity competition, the typical situation is that the position of leader is most preferred and that the follower's position is least desirable, with simultaneous moves resulting in intermediate payoffs. Hence, in this situation a fight - a Stackelberg war - might arise as to which of the players will assume the leadership role. In an earlier paper in this journal (Van Damme and Hurkens, 1999) we addressed the question of which player will succeed in obtaining this most privileged position. We focused on the case of homogeneous products with linear demand and constant marginal cost, with one firm being a more efficient producer than the other. Using an endogenous timing game introduced in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), we showed that committing to move early is more risky for the high cost firm, hence, that risk dominance considerations (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) imply that the efficient firm will take up the leadership position.

In the present paper we address the same question in the context of price competition in a duopoly with differentiated substitutable products, linear and symmetric demand, and constant marginal cost. Again we assume that one firm is more efficient than the other and has lower marginal cost. The question is whether also in this case the more efficient firm will emerge as the leader in the game.

Price competition, however, is fundamentally different from quantity competition in that the leadership role now is not the most preferred one. While it is indeed true that, under general conditions, a price duopolist prefers to move first to moving simultaneously, a player can benefit even more if he can move last. (See Boyer and Moreaux, 1987; Dowrick, 1986; and Gal-Or, 1985). The basic intuition can be easily seen when firms are identical. First of all one notices that the price of the leader p^L is larger than the Nash equilibrium price p^N since the leader's total profit, taking into account the rival's optimal reaction, is increasing in his price at the Nash equilibrium. Since the follower's reaction curve is flatter than the 45 degree line, the follower's price p^F is smaller than

p^L . Consequently, $\pi^F(p^L, p^F) > \pi^F(p^L, p^L) = \pi^L(p^L, p^L) > \pi^L(p^L, p^F) > \pi^L(p^N, p^N)$. (The first inequality follows since p^F is on the follower's reaction curve, the second since the leader profits from a higher price of the follower, and the last since the leader could have chosen p^N instead of p^L .) Hence, if firms are identical, each firm prefers following above leading, while any sequential order is preferred above moving simultaneously. By continuity, these preferences remain when differences between the firms are not too large.¹

As in our earlier paper, we use the "action commitment" model from Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) to determine which player will get which role. The model allows firms to choose a price either early or late; choices within a period are simultaneous, but if one firm moves early and the other moves late, the latter is informed about the former's price before making its choice. Since following confers advantages, it follows that the game has two pure equilibria corresponding to the two possible sequential orderings of the moves, with players having opposite preferences about these equilibria. In our view, the question of who will take up the most preferred role amounts to solving the problem of which player is willing to take the largest risk in waiting and we formally answer this question by using the risk-dominance concept from Harsanyi and Selten (1988). The surprising conclusion is that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm, hence, the efficient firm will emerge as the price leader and the less efficient firm will take up the more favorable follower role. Relating this result to our earlier paper, we see that the identity of the leader is independent of whether prices or quantities are the strategic variables.

The basic intuition for our main result derives from the fact that the high cost firm has more to gain from moving last. As each firm prefers to follow, it is natural to assume that each player initially expects the other to hold out. Players cannot maintain these expectations, however, as both players holding out is not a Nash equilibrium. Hence, each player is forced to adjust his expectations and he will represent his uncertainty by a mixed strategy that assigns some weight to the opponent committing to a (possibly random) price and that puts the complementary weight on the opponent waiting. As the high cost firm gains more from waiting, it is more insisting on this position. To put it differently, as long as the low cost firm finds it attractive to wait, the high cost firm finds this attractive as well. Hence, given that one firm has to give in, this will be the low cost firm. The high cost firm will thus obtain the most preferred position.

Our paper thus provides a game theoretic justification for price leadership by the efficient or dominant firm. The traditional industrial organization literature has emphasized

price leadership in general and leadership by the dominant firm in particular. It argues that leadership allows firms to better coordinate their prices and that it results in higher prices and lower consumer surplus, thus raising possible antitrust concerns. However, that literature is not so clear on which firm will take up the leadership role. For example, Markham (1951) in his seminal paper concluded on the one hand that "... price 'leadership' in a dominant firm market is not simply a *modus operandi* designed to circumvent price competition among rival sellers but is instead an inevitable consequence of the industry's structure," while on the other hand he stated that "... in a large number of industries which do not contain a partial monopolist, the price leader is frequently but not always the largest firm." Similarly, Scherer and Ross (1990) list as distinguishing characteristics of (barometric) price leadership "... occasional changes in the identity of the price leader (who is likely in any case to be one of the largest sellers)." We believe that the risk considerations that we stress in our paper might shed some light on these issues of price leadership in practice.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The underlying duopoly game as well as the action commitment game from Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) are described in Section 2, where also the relevant notation is introduced. Section 3 describes the specifics of the risk dominance concept (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) as it applies to this context. The main results are derived in Section 4. Section 5 shows that a shortcut, based on risk-dominance in the restricted game where each player can only choose between committing to his leader price and waiting, would have given the wrong result, and argues that this is because the restricted game does not provide a faithful description of the actual risks involved. Section 6 offers a brief conclusion.

2 The Model

The underlying linear price setting duopoly game is as follows. There are two firms, 1 and 2. Firm i produces product i at a constant marginal cost $c_i \geq 0$. The goods are imperfect substitutes and the demand for good i is given by

$$D_i(p_i, p_j) = \max \{1 - p_i + ap_j, 0\},$$

where $0 < a < 1$. Firms choose prices simultaneously and the profit of firm i is given by $u_i(p_i, p_j) = (p_i - c_i)D_i(p_i, p_j)$. We assume that $1 > c_1 > c_2 > 0$, hence firm 2 is more efficient than firm 1. The best reply of player j against the price p_i of player i is unique and is given by

$$b_j(p_i) = \frac{1 + ap_i + c_j}{2}. \quad (2.1)$$

The unique maximizer of the function $p_i \mapsto u_i(p_i, b_j(p_i))$ is denoted by p_i^L (firm i 's leader price). We also write p_j^F for the price that j will choose as a price follower, $p_j^F = b_j(p_i^L)$, and $L_i = u_i(p_i^L, p_j^F)$ and $F_i = u_i(p_i^F, p_j^L)$. We write (p_1^N, p_2^N) for the unique Nash equilibrium of the game and denote player i 's payoff in this equilibrium by N_i . For later reference we note that

$$p_i^L = \frac{2 + a + ac_j + (2 - a^2)c_i}{2(2 - a^2)} \quad (2.2a)$$

$$p_i^F = \frac{4 + 2a - a^2 + (4 - a^2)c_i + (2a - a^3)c_j}{4(2 - a^2)} \quad (2.2b)$$

$$p_i^N = \frac{2 + a + ac_j + 2c_i}{4 - a^2} \quad (2.2c)$$

and

$$L_i = \frac{(2 + a + ac_j + (a^2 - 2)c_i)^2}{8(2 - a^2)} \quad (2.3a)$$

$$F_i = \frac{(4 + 2a - a^2 + (2a - a^3)c_j + (3a^2 - 4)c_i)^2}{16(2 - a^2)^2} \quad (2.3b)$$

$$N_i = \frac{(2 + a + ac_j + (a^2 - 2)c_i)^2}{(4 - a^2)^2} \quad (2.3c)$$

One easily verifies that $p_1^L > p_2^L$ and $p_1^F > p_2^F$. It also readily follows that

$$p_i^L > p_i^F > p_i^N \quad (i = 1, 2)$$

$$F_i > L_i > N_i. \quad (i = 1, 2)$$

Hence, each player has an incentive to commit himself (compared to the simultaneous play equilibrium) but prefers to follow. Straightforward computations show that $F_1 - L_1 > F_2 - L_2$, hence the high cost firm benefits more from being the follower than the

low cost firm. Obviously, the above inequality is equivalent to $L_2 + F_1 > L_1 + F_2$, hence total profits are larger when the efficient firm leads. The question we address in this paper is whether the players will succeed in reaching that “efficient” ordering of the moves.

To investigate which player will dare to wait when both players have the opportunity to do so, we make use of the *two-period action commitment game* that was proposed in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The rules are as follows. There are two periods and each player has to choose a price in exactly one of these periods. Within a period, choices are simultaneous, but, if a player does not choose to move in period 1, then in period 2 this player is informed about which action his opponent chose in period 1. This game has proper subgames at $t = 2$ and our assumptions imply that all of these have unique equilibria. We will analyze the reduced game, g^2 , that results when these subgames are replaced by their equilibrium values. Formally, the strategy set of player i in g^2 is $\mathbb{R}_+ \cup \{w_i\}$ and the payoff function is given by

$$u_i(p_i, p_j) = (p_i - c_i)(1 - p_i + ap_j) \quad (2.4)$$

$$u_i(p_i, w_j) = (p_i - c_i)(1 - p_i + a(1 + ap_i + c_j)/2) \quad (2.5)$$

$$u_i(w_i, p_j) = (1 + ap_j - c_i)^2/4 \quad (2.6)$$

$$u_i(w_i, w_j) = N_i \quad (2.7)$$

Note that u_i is strictly concave in p_i . It is easily seen that g^2 has three Nash equilibria in pure strategies: Either each player i commits to his Nash price p_i^N in the first period, or one player i commits to his leader price p_i^L and the other player waits till the second period. Mixed equilibria will not be considered², but mixed strategies will play an important role. They represent uncertainty about whether a player will commit himself and to which price. Let m_j be a mixed strategy of player j in the game g^2 . Because of the linear-quadratic specification of the game, there are only three “characteristics” of m_j that are relevant to player i , viz. w_j the probability that player j waits, μ_j the average price to which j commits himself given that he commits, and ν_j , the variance of this price. Specifically, it easily follows from (2.4)-(2.7) that the expected payoff of

player i against a mixed strategy m_j with characteristics (w_j, μ_j, ν_j) is given by

$$\begin{aligned} u_i(p_i, m_j) &= (1 - w_j)(p_i - c_i)(1 - p_i + a\mu_j) \\ &\quad + w_j(p_i - c_i)(1 - p_i + a(1 + ap_i + c_j)/2) \end{aligned} \quad (2.8)$$

$$\begin{aligned} u_i(w_i, m_j) &= (1 - w_j)[a^2\nu_j/4 + (1 + a\mu_j - c_i)^2/4] \\ &\quad + w_j[(2 + a + ac_j + (a^2 - 2)c_i)/(4 - a^2)]^2 \end{aligned} \quad (2.9)$$

Note that (2.8) and (2.9) show that uncertainty concerning the price to which j will commit himself makes it more attractive for player i to wait: ν_j contributes positively to (2.9) and it does not play a role in (2.8). On the other hand, increasing w_j clearly increases the incentive for player i to commit himself. Finally, increasing μ_j increases the incentive for player i to commit himself, because of the positive effect on i 's demand.

3 Risk Dominance and the Tracing Procedure

The concept of *risk dominance* captures the intuitive idea that, when players do not know which of two equilibria should be played, they will measure the risk involved in playing each of these equilibria and they will coordinate expectations on the less risky one, i.e. on the risk dominant equilibrium of the pair. The formal definition of risk dominance involves the *bicentric prior* and the *tracing procedure*. The bicentric prior describes the players' initial assessment about the situation. If this initial assessment is not an equilibrium of the game, it cannot constitute the players' final view and the players have to adjust their plans and expectations until they are in equilibrium. The tracing procedure is a formal model of this adjustment process; it models the thought process of players who, by deductive personal reflection, try to figure out what to do in this situation. Below we describe the mechanics of the tracing procedure as well as how, according to Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the initial prior should be constructed.

3.1 Bicentric Prior

Let $g = (S_1, S_2, u_1, u_2)$ be a 2-person game and let s and s' be two equilibria of this game. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) argue that when players are uncertain about which of these two equilibria should be played, their initial beliefs should be constructed as follows. Player j , being Bayesian, will assign a subjective probability z_j to i playing s_i and he will assign the complementary probability $z'_j = 1 - z_j$ to i playing s'_i . With these

beliefs, player j will play the best response against the mixed strategy $z_j s_i + z'_j s'_i$ of player i , which we denote by $b_j(z_j)$.³ Player j , knowing his prior z_j , knows which action he will play. Player i , however, does not know z_j exactly and, therefore, cannot predict exactly what j will do. Applying the principle of insufficient reason, Harsanyi and Selten (1988) argue that i will consider z_j to be uniformly distributed on $[0, 1]$. Writing Z_j for a uniformly distributed random variable on $[0, 1]$, player i will, therefore, believe that he is facing the mixed strategy

$$m_j = b_j(Z_j) \tag{3.1}$$

and this mixed strategy m_j of player j is player i 's prior belief about j 's behavior in the situation at hand. Similarly, $m_i = b_i(Z_i)$, where Z_1 and Z_2 are independent, is the prior belief of player j , and the mixed strategy pair $m = (m_1, m_2)$ is called the *bicentric prior* associated with the pair (s, s') .

3.2 Tracing Procedure

Mathematically, the tracing procedure is a map converting initial beliefs into equilibria of the game. Let m_i be a mixed strategy of player i in g ($i = 1, 2$). The strategy m_i represents the initial uncertainty of player j about i 's behavior. For $t \in [0, 1]$ we define the game $g^{t,m} = (S_1, S_2, u_1^{t,m}, u_2^{t,m})$ in which the payoff functions are given by

$$u_i^{t,m}(s_i, s_j) = (1 - t)u_i(s_i, m_j) + tu_i(s_i, s_j). \tag{3.2}$$

Hence, for $t = 1$, this game $g^{t,m}$ coincides with the original game g , while for $t = 0$ we have a trivial game in which each player's payoff depends only on his own action and his own prior beliefs.⁴ Write Γ^m for the graph of the equilibrium correspondence, i.e.

$$\Gamma^m = \{(t, s) : t \in [0, 1], s \text{ is an equilibrium of } g^{t,m}\}.$$

It can be shown that, if g is a generic *finite* game, then, for almost any prior m , this graph Γ^m contains a unique distinguished curve that connects the unique equilibrium $s^{0,m}$ of $g^{0,m}$ with an equilibrium $s^{1,m}$ of $g^{1,m}$. (See Schanuel *et al.*, 1991, for details.) The equilibrium $s^{1,m}$ is called the *linear trace* of m . If players' initial beliefs are given

by m and if players' reasoning process corresponds to that as modeled by the tracing procedure, then players' expectations will converge on the equilibrium $s^{1,m}$ of g . Below, we will apply the tracing procedure to the *infinite* game g^2 that was described in the previous section. For such games, no generalizations of the Schanuel *et al.* (1991) results have been established yet, but as we will see in the following section, there indeed exists a unique distinguished curve in the special case analyzed here. Hence, the non-finiteness of the game g^2 will create no special problems.

3.3 Risk Dominance

Risk dominance is defined as follows. Consider two equilibria, s and s' of g . Use the construction described in subsection 3.1 to determine the bicentric prior, m , associated with the pair (s, s') . Then apply the tracing procedure of subsection 3.2 to m , i.e. compute the linear trace of this prior, $s^{1,m}$. We now say that s *risk dominates* s' if $s^{1,m} = s$. Similarly, s' risk dominates s if $s^{1,m} = s'$. In case the outcome of the tracing procedure is an equilibrium different from s or s' , then neither of the equilibria risk dominates the other. Below we show that the latter situation will not occur in our 2-stage action commitment game, provided that the costs of the firms are different.

4 Commitment and Risk Dominance

In this section, we prove our main results. Let g^2 be the endogenous commitment game from Section 2. Write S_i for the pure equilibrium in which player i commits to his leader price in period 1, $S_i = (p_i^L, w_j)$, and write B for the equilibrium in which each player commits to his Bertrand price in period 1, $B = (p_1^N, p_2^N)$. We show that both price leader equilibria risk dominate the Bertrand equilibrium and that S_2 risk dominates S_1 when $c_2 < c_1$. The first result is quite intuitive: Committing to p_i^N is a weakly dominated strategy and playing a weakly dominated strategy is risky. The proof of this result is correspondingly easy and can be found in Appendix A1.

Proposition 1 *In g^2 , the price leader equilibrium S_i risk dominates the Nash equilibrium B ($i = 1, 2$).*

We now turn to the risk comparison of the two price leader equilibria. We first show that, when confronted with the problem to coordinate on S_1 or S_2 , each player's prior belief is that the other player will commit to a random price. Let player j believe that i

commits to p_i^L with probability z and that i waits with probability $1 - z$. Waiting yields

$$u_j(w_j, zp_i^L + (1 - z)w_i) = zF_j + (1 - z)N_j.$$

Since the mapping $p \mapsto u_j(p, b_i(p))$ is concave and attains its maximum at p_j^L , and since $p_j^F \in (p_j^N, p_j^L)$, we have

$$u_j(p_j^F, b_i(p_j^F)) > u_j(p_j^N, b_i(p_j^N)) = N_j,$$

so that

$$u_j(p_j^F, zp_i^L + (1 - z)w_i) > u_j(w_j, zp_i^L + (1 - z)w_i).$$

Therefore, committing to p_j^F yields higher payoff than waiting, and it follows that each player will believe that the opponent will commit with probability 1. To determine the price that j will commit to, note that committing to price p_j yields

$$u_j(p_j, zp_i^L + (1 - z)w_i) = (p_j - c_j)[1 - p_j + a(zp_i^L + (1 - z)(1 + ap_j + c_i)/2)].$$

Given z , the optimal commitment price $p_j(z)$ of player j must satisfy the first order condition $\partial u_j(p_j, zp_i^L + (1 - z)w_i)/\partial p_j = 0$, and is, hence, given by

$$p_j(z) = \frac{(1 - z)(2 - a^2)p_j^L + 2zp_j^F}{2 - a^2(1 - z)}. \quad (4.1)$$

Note that $p_1(z) > p_2(z)$ for all $z \in [0, 1]$, since $p_1^L > p_2^L$ and $p_1^F > p_2^F$. This means that firm 1 expects firm 2 to commit to a low price, while firm 2 expects firm 1 to commit to a high price. From

$$p_j'(z) = \frac{2(2 - a^2)(p_j^F - p_j^L)}{(2 - a^2(1 - z))^2},$$

one easily verifies that $p_2'(z) < p_1'(z) < 0$ since $p_2^F - p_2^L < p_1^F - p_1^L < 0$. Hence, firm 2's price is expected to vary more than firm 1's price. (See Appendix A2 for a formal proof.) We summarize these results in Lemma 1.

Lemma 1 *Player i 's bicentric prior m_j is that j will commit to a random price $p_j(z)$ with expectation μ_j and variance ν_j , where $\mu_j \in (p_j^F, p_j^L)$ and $\nu_j > 0$. Moreover, we have $\mu_1 > \mu_2$ and $\nu_1 < \nu_2$.*

Now, let us turn to the tracing procedure. The starting point (the initial equilibrium) corresponds to the best reply against the prior. Since both players expect the other to commit with probability one and are uncertain about this committed price, the unique best reply for both players is to wait. As t increases, player i attaches more and more weight (namely t) to the event that player j will wait. At some critical point \bar{t}_i it must become profitable to commit and take the leader role. Lemma 1 and the equations (2.8) and (2.9) provide the intuition that the low cost firm will switch before the high cost firm will, i.e. that $\bar{t}_1 > \bar{t}_2$: since player 1 (the high cost firm) commits to a higher and less variable price, it is relatively more attractive for firm 2 to commit to a price. We elaborate below and relegate the formal proof to Appendix A3.

Recall from Section 2 that the expected payoff of player i depends only on his action and the three important characteristics of the opponent's (mixed) strategy, viz. the probability that the other player waits, the average price of the opponent if he commits, and the variance of that price. As long as no player switches away from waiting the tracing procedure will adjust only the probability that the other waits: the average commitment price and the variation of this price do not change. Hence, the expectation of player i at time t , given that no one has switched yet, is given by the mixed strategy $m_j^t = (1-t)m_j + tw_j$. Identifying this mixed strategy with its important characteristics, write $m_j^t = (t, \mu_j, \nu_j)$. The expected payoff for player i from committing and waiting is given in (2.8) and (2.9), respectively. For $m^t = (t, \mu, \nu)$ define the gain from committing for i as

$$g_i(m^t) = \max_{p_i} u_i(p_i, m^t) - u_i(w_i, m^t).$$

We will show that firm 2 always has a higher incentive to commit himself than firm 1, i.e. that $g_2(m_1^t) > g_1(m_2^t)$ for all t . Since the gain of committing is negative at $t = 0$ and positive at $t = 1$, this implies that firm 2 will switch before firm 1 does.

The formal proof is divided into three steps and is given in Appendix A3. We now provide intuition for each step. In the first step we show that the gain from committing is increasing in the opponent's price. From equations (2.4) and (2.6) it follows in a straightforward manner that

$$\frac{\partial u_i(p_i, p_j)}{\partial p_j} = a(p_i - c_i)$$

and

$$\frac{\partial u_i(w_i, p_j)}{\partial p_j} = a(b_i(p_j) - c_i),$$

i.e. the marginal effect on i 's profit of an increase in j 's price is equal to the price-cost margin multiplied with the marginal increase in demand. Since j will never commit to a price above p_j^L , $b_i(p_j) < p_i^F$. On the other hand, if firm i commits himself he will (optimally) commit to a price above p_i^F . The effect of an increase in p_j is thus larger when i commits himself than when he waits.

Secondly, the gain from committing is decreasing in the variability of the price of the opponent. This is very intuitive. We know from Lemma 1 that $\nu_1 < \nu_2$ so that firm 1 is more uncertain about the price firm 2 will commit himself to. Clearly, this gives him more reason to wait and less to commit.

Finally, we show that the low cost firm has more incentive to commit than a high cost firm even if they have exactly the same expectation about the commitment price of the opponent. This follows from the fact that the high cost firm gains more from being the follower than the low cost firm, i.e. that $F_1 - L_1 > F_2 - L_2$. The above steps can now be combined to show that, with μ_k and ν_k as in Lemma 1 we get

$$g_2(t, \mu_1, \nu_1) > g_2(t, \mu_2, \nu_1) > g_2(t, \mu_2, \nu_2) > g_1(t, \mu_2, \nu_2). \quad (4.2)$$

The above inequalities imply that at any point in the tracing procedure player 2 gains more from committing than firm 1, and, therefore, it must be player 2 who will decide to switch first, i.e. $\bar{t}_1 > \bar{t}_2$. Thus, both players wait till \bar{t}_2 at which point player 2 is exactly indifferent between waiting and committing optimally (to $\tilde{p}_2(\bar{t}_2)$). The graph of the equilibrium correspondence exhibits a “vertical” segment at t_2 . Any pair of strategies in which firm 1 waits and firm 2 mixes between waiting (with probability w) and committing to $\tilde{p}_2(\bar{t}_2)$ (with probability $1 - w$) is an equilibrium of $g^{\bar{t}_2, m}$: Firm 2 is indifferent and any mixture is therefore a best reply. Firm 1 strictly prefers to wait when $w = 1$ (since $g_1(m_2^{\bar{t}_2}) < g_2(m_2^{\bar{t}_2}) = 0$) and also when $w = 0$ (since then firm 2 commits for sure to a random price). Because of linearity (in w) firm 1 prefers to wait for any $w \in [0, 1]$. From \bar{t}_2 onward, player 2 commits with probability 1 (but changes the commitment price continuously) and player 2 waits with probability 1. Therefore, the tracing procedure ends up in an equilibrium where player 2 commits and player 1 waits, i.e. at S_2 . This concludes the proof of Proposition 2.

Proposition 2 *The price leader equilibrium S_2 in which the low cost firm leads risk dominates the one in which the high cost firm leads.*

By combining the Propositions 1 and 2 we, therefore, obtain our main result:

Theorem 1 *The price leader equilibrium in which the efficient firm leads and the inefficient firm follows is the risk dominant equilibrium of the endogenous price commitment game.*

Note that, if the costs of firm 1 are not much higher than the costs of firm 2, then $F_1 > L_2$, i.e. the high cost firm makes higher profits (as a price follower) in the risk dominant equilibrium than the efficient firm (as a price leader). This seems curious and counterintuitive at first sight since it could give incentives to the low cost firm to increase its cost (if he would be able to do that in a credible way). However, given the cost structure, waiting is less risky for a high cost firm than for a low cost firm, and the inefficient firm profits from its “weak” position.

5 Risk Dominance in the Reduced Game

It is well known that risk dominance allows a very simple characterization for 2×2 games with two Nash equilibria: the risk dominant equilibrium is that one for which the product of the deviation losses is largest. Consequently, if risk dominance could always be decided on the basis of the reduced game spanned by the two equilibria under consideration (and if the resulting relation would be transitive), then the solution could be found by straightforward computations. Unfortunately, this happy state of affairs does not prevail in general. The two concepts do not always generate the same solution and it is well-known that the Nash product of the deviation losses may be a bad description of the underlying risk situation in general. (See, Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) for a simple example.) This is also true for the game analyzed in this paper as the reduced game analysis produces exactly the opposite result from that obtained by applying the tracing procedure to the full game. The calculations are straightforward and can be found in the working paper version of this paper, Van Damme and Hurkens (2001). We will here provide the intuition for why the reduced game describes the underlying risks so badly in the case of price competition with substitutable products. Let us start by comparing how the bicentric priors are constructed in the full and the reduced game. Recall from the previous section that when firm i is uncertain whether firm j commits or waits, it is optimal for this firm to commit to a price between the leader price and the follower price. The bicentric prior in the full game has therefore both firms believing that the other will commit, although they are not sure to which price exactly. In the reduced game, however, committing to an intermediate price is not possible, and waiting becomes optimal when one expects the rival to commit with

high probability. Consequently, the bicentric prior of the reduced game attaches positive weight to opponent j committing to p_j^L as well as to j waiting, with the efficient firm being more likely to wait.

Given that the bicentric priors are qualitatively different in the two approaches, it is not surprising that the tracing procedure may map these priors into different equilibria. Indeed, in the reduced game the best reply against the prior is for the efficient firm to wait and for the inefficient firm to commit and these actions remain optimal throughout the tracing procedure. Hence, the reduced game produces the equilibrium in which the inefficient firm will lead. As we have seen above, the full game produces the opposite Stackelberg equilibrium.

It is worthwhile to point out that the difference between the two approaches lies not only in the different bicentric priors. Even if we would construct the bicentric prior based on the full game, but again use the 2×2 game to determine who will switch first and become the price leader, we will get the wrong result. If firms can only commit to the leader price, the high cost firm would switch first. However, firms would switch earlier if they could use a safer strategy, like committing to the follower price. Given that opportunity, the low cost firm will switch first and become the price leader. For further details we again refer the reader to the working paper version of this paper.

6 Conclusion

In this paper we studied the strategic choice of whether to lead or to follow in a duopoly price competition game with symmetrically horizontally differentiated products and where the firms differ in their marginal costs. We analysed a model in which firms can decide to move early or late and, by using the risk dominance criterion, we were able to show that the efficient firm will act as a price leader and that the inefficient firm will occupy the more preferred role. Note that this does not necessarily imply that the largest firm will lead. The efficient firm has the largest market share if and only if he charges the lowest price and whether this holds depends on the extent to which the costs differ. If the cost difference is small the efficient leader will have the higher price (hence the smaller market share) and if the difference is large it will have the lowest price (and the larger market share). So our results are in line with the empirical observation that the price leader is often, but not always, the larger firm.⁵

As compared to the alternative candidate solution, where the least efficient firm leads, the total profits in the risk dominant equilibrium are higher (since $L_2 + F_1 > L_1 + F_2$),

the division of the profits is more equal ($|L_1 - F_2| < |L_2 - F_1|$) and consumer surplus is lower. To see why the latter holds, consider first the case where $p_1^L > p_1^F > p_2^L > p_2^F$. Since $p_2^L - p_2^F > p_1^L - p_1^F$ one sees that when we go from S_2 to S_1 , the price decrease of good 2 is larger than the price increase of good 1. Since consumers buy more of good 2 than of good 1, this means that the bundle consumed under S_2 can be bought under S_1 for less money, which of course implies that consumers are better off when firm 1 is the leader. The argument for the other case where $p_1^L > p_2^L > p_1^F > p_2^F$ is similar. First note that the goods are completely symmetric so that consumers are indifferent between the situation of S_2 and the situation in which firm 1 charges p_2^L and firm 2 charges p_1^F . If we compare the latter situation with S_1 we see that, since $p_1^F - p_2^F > p_1^L - p_2^L$, the price decrease of good 2 is larger than the price increase of good 1 so that again consumers prefer firm 1 to lead.

The conclusion that the efficient firm will move first appears to be robust. In our companion paper (Van Damme and Hurkens, 1999) we derive it for the case of quantity competition, Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) obtained it for the case of capacity-constrained price competition and homogeneous goods, and Cabrales *et al.* (2000) derived the result for the case of vertical product differentiation, where firms first choose qualities and next compete in prices. This latter paper also makes use of the concept of risk dominance, but it does not derive the result analytically; instead the authors resort to numerical computations and simulations. To our knowledge, the present paper, together with its companion on quantity competition, are the first applications of the (linear) tracing procedure to games where the strategy spaces are not finite. We have seen that, although there may be some computational complexities, no new conceptual difficulties are encountered. Of course, more important than this methodological aspect is the apparent robustness result itself, which might provide the theoretical underpinning for the observed phenomenon in practise that frequently the dominant firm indeed acts as the leader (Scherer and Ross, 1990).

Note that we did not provide the solution of the endogenous timing game for the case where both firms have the same marginal costs. The reader might conjecture that in that case the Bertrand equilibrium would be selected, i.e. that firms would move simultaneously, and indeed that is correct. Clearly, if the firms are completely symmetric, none of the price leader equilibria can risk dominate the other as the solution of a symmetric game has to be symmetric. Similarly, none of the asymmetric mixed strategy equilibria can be the solution and since there are no symmetric mixed equilibria (as shown in Sect. 2), the solution has to be the Bertrand equilibrium. However, providing a formal direct

proof is difficult. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) show that in the symmetric case the solution of the game is the linear trace of the barycentric prior $\frac{1}{2}p_i^L + \frac{1}{2}w_i$, provided the linear tracing procedure is well-defined. In Appendix A4, however, we show that the linear trace of this prior cannot be the Bertrand equilibrium. The intuition that we do not end up at the Bertrand equilibrium is simple: if the tracing path would converge there, then each player would have an incentive to wait (because each firm would expect the other to commit to a random price) and that cannot be an equilibrium. It follows that the linear tracing procedure cannot be well-defined in this case and that the logarithmic tracing procedure has to be used.

We conclude by noting that the main result of this paper does not depend on the assumption that there are only two points in time when the prices can potentially be chosen. Assume that the market opens at time $t = 0$, but that firms could fix their price at any time point $t = 0, -1, -2, \dots, -T$, with players being committed to a price once it has been chosen and with players being fully informed about the past history.⁶ The solution may be determined by backwards induction, i.e. by applying the subgame consistency principle from Harsanyi and Selten (1988). It is common knowledge that, once the game reaches time $t = -1$ with no commitments being made, the efficient firm will commit to p_2^L while the high cost firm will wait. Knowing this, at $t < -1$, both players find it in their interest to wait. The predicted outcome, hence, is not sensitive to the number of commitment periods: both firms will make their price announcements only shortly before the market opens, with the efficient firm making the announcement slightly earlier.

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Appendix

A1

Proof of Proposition 1.

Without loss of generality, we just prove that S_1 risk dominates B . We first compute the bicentric prior that is relevant for this risk comparison, starting with the prior beliefs of player 1.

Let player 2 believe that 1 plays $z_2 S_{11} + (1 - z_2) B_1 = z_2 p_1^L + (1 - z_2) p_1^N$. Obviously, if $z_2 \in (0, 1)$, then the unique best response of player 2 is to wait, $b_2(z_2) = w_2$. Hence, the prior belief of player 1 is that player 2 will wait with probability 1, $m_2 = w_2$.

Next, let player 1 believe that 2 plays $z_1 S_{12} + (1 - z_1) B_2 = z_1 w_2 + (1 - z_1) p_2^N$. Obviously, waiting yields player 1 the Nash payoff N_1 as in (2.3c), irrespective of the value of z_1 .

When $z_1 > 0$ then committing to a price that is (slightly) above p_1^N yields a strictly higher payoff, hence, the best response is to commit to a certain price $p_1(z_1)$, $b_1(z_1) = p_1(z_1)$. The reader easily verifies that $p_1(z_1)$ increases with z_1 and that $p_1(1) = p_1^L$. Consequently, if m_1 is the prior belief of player 2 then for the characteristics (w_1, μ_1, ν_1) of m_1 we have: $w_1 = 0$, $\mu_1 > p_1^N$, $\nu_1 > 0$.

Now, let us turn to the tracing procedure. The starting point corresponds to the best replies against the prior. Obviously, the unique best response against m_2 is for player 1 to commit to p_1^L , while player 2's unique best response against m_1 is to wait. Hence, the unique equilibrium at $t = 0$ is S_1 . Since S_1 is an equilibrium of the original game, it is an equilibrium for any $t \in [0, 1]$. Consequently, the distinguished curve in the graph Γ^m is the curve $\{(t, S_1) : t \in [0, 1]\}$ and S_1 risk dominates B . \square

A2

Let $Z \sim \text{Un}(0, 1)$, $Z_i = p_i(Z)$ and $\nu_i = \text{Var}(Z_i)$. We need to prove $\nu_1 < \nu_2$. We will only use that $p_2'(z) < p_1'(z) < 0$.

$$\begin{aligned}
\nu_1 - \nu_2 &= \int_0^1 p_1(z)^2 dz - \left[\int_0^1 p_1(z) dz \right]^2 - \int_0^1 p_2(z)^2 dz + \left[\int_0^1 p_2(z) dz \right]^2 \\
&= \int_0^1 [p_1(z)^2 - p_2(z)^2] dz - (\mu_1^2 - \mu_2^2) \\
&= \int_0^1 [(p_1(z) - p_2(z))(p_1(z) + p_2(z))] dz - (\mu_1 - \mu_2)(\mu_1 + \mu_2) \\
&= \int_0^1 [p_1(z) - p_2(z)][p_1(z) + p_2(z) - \mu_1 - \mu_2] dz \\
&= \left[(p_1(z) - p_2(z)) \left(\int_0^z [p_1(t) + p_2(t) - \mu_1 - \mu_2] dt \right) \right]_0^1 \\
&\quad - \int_0^1 [p_1'(z) - p_2'(z)] \left[\int_0^z (p_1(t) + p_2(t) - \mu_1 - \mu_2) dt \right] dz \\
&= 0 - \int_0^1 [p_1'(z) - p_2'(z)] \left[\int_0^z (p_1(t) + p_2(t) - \mu_1 - \mu_2) dt \right] dz
\end{aligned}$$

The first factor within the integral is positive. It suffices to show that the second factor is also nonnegative. Well, the second factor is equal to zero for $z = 0$ and for $z = 1$. The result follows once we have shown that the second factor is a concave function of z . The first derivative of the second factor (with respect to z) is

$$-\mu_1 + p_1(z) - \mu_2 + p_2(z)$$

and the second derivative is

$$p_1'(z) + p_2'(z) < 0.$$

□

A3

We prove the three inequalities in (4.2).

(i) $g_2(t, \mu_1, \nu_1) > g_2(t, \mu_2, \nu_1)$.

Proof. Given expectations $m^t = (t, \mu, \nu)$, the optimal commitment price, $\tilde{p}_i(t)$ can be easily computed. The computations are almost identical to the derivation of $p_j(z)$ in (4.1), and one finds

$$\tilde{p}_i(t) = \frac{2(1-t)b_i(\mu) + t(2-a^2)p_i^L}{2-a^2t}. \quad (\text{A.1})$$

If $\mu < p_j^L$ then $b_i(\mu) < p_i^F < p_i^L$ and it follows that $\tilde{p}_i(t) \geq b_i(\mu)$. Using the theorem of the maximum, one now easily verifies that

$$\frac{\partial g_i(m^t)}{\partial \mu} = a(1-t)(\tilde{p}_i(t) - b_i(\mu)) \geq 0. \quad (\text{A.2})$$

Since $p_1^L > \mu_1 > \mu_2$ we have that $\tilde{p}_2(t) \geq b_2(\mu_1) \geq b_2(\mu_2)$. It follows from (A.2) that

$$g_2(t, \mu_1, \nu_1) > g_2(t, \mu_2, \nu_1).$$

□

(ii) $g_2(t, \mu_2, \nu_1) > g_2(t, \mu_2, \nu_2)$.

Proof. Again using the theorem of the maximum, one finds

$$\frac{\partial g_i(m^t)}{\partial \nu} = -(1-t)a^2/4 < 0. \quad (\text{A.3})$$

Since $\nu_1 < \nu_2$, it follows from (A.3) that

$$g_2(t, \mu_2, \nu_1) > g_2(t, \mu_2, \nu_2).$$

□

(iii) $g_2(t, \mu_2, \nu_2) > g_1(t, \mu_2, \nu_2)$.

Proof.

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial g_i(t, \mu, \nu)}{\partial c_i} &= -(1-t)(1 - \tilde{p}_i(t) + a\mu) - t(1 - \tilde{p}_i(t) + a(1 + a\tilde{p}_i(t) + c_j)/2) \\ &\quad + (1-t)(1 + a\mu - c_i)/2 - t \frac{\partial N_i}{\partial c_i} \\ &= \tilde{p}_i(t) - b_i(\mu) + t \left\{ \frac{a\mu - 1 + c_i - a(1 + a\tilde{p}_i(t) + c_j)}{2} - \frac{\partial N_i}{\partial c_i} \right\} \end{aligned}$$

Taking the derivative of the right-hand side with respect to t yields

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d}{dt} \left(\frac{\partial g_i}{\partial c_i} \right) &= (1 - a^2t/2)\tilde{p}'(t) + \frac{a\mu - 1 + c_i - a(1 + a\tilde{p}_i(t) + c_j)}{2} - \frac{\partial N_i}{\partial c_i} \\ &= \frac{a(-16 + 8a^2 - 2a^3 - 2a^4 + 2a^3c_i - a^5c_i - a^4c_j)}{4(4 - a^2)^2} < 0 \end{aligned}$$

Hence,

$$\frac{\partial g_i}{\partial c_i}(t, \mu, \nu) \leq \frac{\partial g_i}{\partial c_i}(0, \mu, \nu) = 0.$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial g_i(t, \mu, \nu)}{\partial c_j} &= t(\tilde{p}_i(t) - c_i)a/2 - t \frac{\partial N_i}{\partial c_j} \\
&= t(\tilde{p}_i(t) - c_i)a/2 - 2at \frac{(p_i^N - c_i)}{4 - a^2} \\
&= \frac{at}{2(4 - a^2)} \{ (4 - a^2)(\tilde{p}_i(t) - c_i) - 4(p_i^N - c_i) \} \\
&> \frac{at}{2(4 - a^2)} \{ (4 - a^2)((b_i(\mu) - c_i) - 4(p_i^N - c_i)) \} \\
&= \frac{at}{2(4 - a^2)} (a^2 c_i + 4(b_i(\mu) - p_i^N)) > 0
\end{aligned}$$

The gain of committing for player i is decreasing in c_i and increasing in c_j . Hence,

$$g_2(m_2|c_1, c_2) \geq g_2(m_2|c_2, c_1) = g_1(m_2|c_1, c_2) = g_1(m_2).$$

□

A4

We show that when firms have identical costs the linear trace of the barycentric prior is *not* the pure equilibrium in which firms commit themselves to the Bertrand equilibrium. Let $m = \frac{1}{2}p^L + \frac{1}{2}w$ be the barycentric prior. Suppose that for t sufficiently close to 1 the equilibrium of $g^{t,m}$ is $x(t) = (1 - w(t))p(t) + w(t)w$, i.e. each firm waits with probability $w(t)$ and commits with probability $(1 - w(t))$ to $p(t)$. Hence, at t players' expectations are given by $m^t = (1 - t)m + tx(t)$. Consider the derivative with respect to t of the gain function $g(m^t)$. Because of the envelope theorem the effect of the (optimal) commitment price cancels out and we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{d}{dt}g(m^t) &= \frac{\partial g(m^t)}{\partial t} + \frac{\partial g(m^t)}{\partial w} w'(t) \\
&= (p(t) - c)a \left\{ -\frac{1}{2}p^L - \frac{1}{2} \frac{1 + ap(t) + c}{2} + (1 - w(t))p(t) + w(t) \frac{1 + ap(t) + c}{2} \right. \\
&\quad \left. + tw'(t) \left(\frac{1 + ap(t) + c}{2} - p(t) \right) \right\} \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{2}F + \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1 + ap(t) - c}{2} \right)^2 - (1 - w(t)) \left(\frac{1 + ap(t) - c}{2} \right)^2 - w(t)N \\
&\quad - tw'(t) \left(N - \left(\frac{1 + ap(t) - c}{2} \right)^2 \right)
\end{aligned}$$

If at $t = 1$ we would have $w(1) = 0$ and $p(1) = p^N$ then

$$\begin{aligned}
 \left(\frac{d}{dt} g(m^t) \right) \Big|_{t=1} &= (p^N - c) a \left(-\frac{1}{2} p^L - \frac{1}{2} p^N + p^N \right) + \frac{1}{2} F + \frac{1}{2} N - N \\
 &= \frac{1}{2} (a(p^N - c)(p^N - p^L) + F - N) \\
 &= \frac{1}{4} a(p^L - p^N)(p^F - p^N) > 0
 \end{aligned}$$

Since at $t = 1$ the gain to commit is zero, this means that firms will strictly prefer to wait at $t < 1$. Hence, the outcome of the linear tracing procedure cannot be the Bertrand equilibrium. \square

Footnotes

1. Preferences of players may, however, be perfectly aligned when there are capacity constraints, since limited capacity reduces the follower's incentive to undercut the leader's price. Deneckere and Kovenock (1992), Furth and Kovenock (1992) and Canoy (1996) show, in a variety of circumstances, that both firms prefer the large firm to lead in this case, provided that capacities are sufficiently asymmetric.
2. In the working paper version of this paper (Van Damme and Hurkens, 2001) we show that there are no equilibria in which both players mix. There are equilibria in which one of the players mixes between committing and waiting, while the other commits. These mixed equilibria will not be considered in this paper, the reason being that we want to stick as close as possible to the general solution procedure outlined in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), a procedure that gives precedence to pure equilibria whenever possible.
3. In general player j may have multiple best replies in which case he should play all of them with equal probability. However, in our setting with strictly quasi-concave profit functions this happens with zero probability, so we may ignore multiple best replies.
4. Loosely speaking the parameter t might be thought of as time. With this interpretation, player i assigns weight $1 - t$ to his prior beliefs at time t , while he gives weight t to the reasoning process at this point in time, at time $t = 1$, when the players' actions are in equilibrium, the player fully trusts the outcome of the reasoning process.
5. If the inefficient firm were to lead, it would certainly have the smaller market share because it sets the highest price, $p_1^L > p_2^F$.
6. This game is analyzed by Robson (1990), where however it is assumed that moving early is associated with higher cost: each firm incurs additional cost $c(t)$ when it moves at time t , where $c(\cdot)$ is decreasing and converging to ∞ as t tends to $-\infty$. It is easily seen that, provided $c(t) - c(t + 1)$ is sufficiently small, the game only has equilibria in which players move in different periods. If both players prefer to lead then in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium that player i for which $L_i - F_i$ is largest will emerge as the leader and he will commit approximately at the time where $L_j - F_j = c(t)$. If both players prefer to follow (as in the model of

the present paper), the game has two subgame perfect equilibria: one player will commit at $t = -1$, while the other will wait till $t = 0$. In this case Robson (1990) cannot determine which of these equilibria will result.